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The Category and the Office of Proclamation, with Particular Reference to Luther and 
Kierkegaard 
 
K.E. Løgstrup 
 
1. 
Proclamation is a category of address. This means that what is proclaimed to a human 
being comes into force for them [tritt für ihn in Kraft].1 What is proclaimed is valid 
for them from the moment that it is proclaimed to them.  
If one wanted to characterize proclamation more precisely, distinguishing it 
from a related phenomenon in order to gain a certain perspective on it, then a 
comparison with the category of communication might naturally come to mind, since 
they are entirely different from one another. For in contrast to what is proclaimed, 
what is communicated²simply as communicated²leaves the life of the human being 
in question completely untouched. What is communicated to a human being²always 
simply as communicated²does not need to intervene in any way in their existence. 
Proclamation presupposes some authority that establishes the validity of that 
which is proclaimed. Proclamation therefore stands or falls with the existence of the 
authority guaranteeing it. By contrast, that which is communicated is²simply as 
communicated²something purely objective. Communication is not grounded on or 
supported by something else that stands behind it; rather, the relation between the 
informant and the recipient is exhausted in the message, as it were, so that what is 
communicated is, as such, of a wholly impersonal nature. 
Because proclamation constitutes a special form of relationship²namely a 
relationship of authority between the one from whom the proclamation comes in the 
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 7KH*HUPDQSKUDVH³LQ.UDIW´VXJJHVWVQRWMXVWWKDWWKHSURFODPDWLRQLVLQIRUFHIRU
the person and has validity or authority for them, but also that it has an impact on them. 
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last instance,2 and the one who receives it²the relationship can be characterized 
further, depending on what receiving it amounts to. If what is proclaimed is 
something good for the recipient, then this relationship of authority can be further 
characterized as either one of trust or mistrust, depending on how what is proclaimed 
is received. If the proclamation has threatening content, then the manner of its 
reception gives the relationship of authority the further characteristic of either 
obedience or rebellion. Once again, communication is wholly different. Because, as I 
said, that which is communicated is²simply as communicated²something objective, 
its reception leaves the impersonality of the relationship untouched. As such, whether 
the recipient is cognizant of the communication or fails to observe it changes nothing 
in the relationship between the informant and the recipient. 
This attempt to fix the difference between the categories of proclamation and 
communication should not be taken to imply that the content of what is proclaimed 
might not prove wholly insignificant, or, on the other hand, that the content of what is 
communicated cannot have major significance for the recipient. For we must 
distinguish between proclamation and communication as two forms of address, on the 
one hand, and the factual content of that which is proclaimed and communicated, on 
the other. It is one thing to understand an utterance with regard to its category as 
proclamation or communication (that is, how that which is proclaimed functions as 
proclamation and how that which is communicated functions as communication); it is 
quite another thing to understand proclamation or communication in terms of their 
purely factual content. An utterance is understood as falling under the category of 
pronouncement or proclamation if it comes into force for the recipient, even though 
they may experience the content of the proclamation as a most insignificant matter. 
We understand an utterance as communication when the informant²from the 
perspective of the category of address²communicates something to us that is 
objective and is not intended to intervene in our existence [Dasein], even when we 
experience its content as changing our life in decisive ways and thus having great 
subjective significance. Furthermore, nothing essential changes regarding the 
categorization of something as communication whether the receiver of a 
communication is furious at the informant or feels pleased with them; the relation 
                                                        
2
 [Here, Løgstrup uses the word ³,QVWDQ]´ZKLFKKDVD judicial meaning that is closely 
connected to authority.²Trans.] 
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between the informant and the recipient is of an impersonal nature, independent of the 
manner in which it is received. In relation to the categorization of something as 
communication, whether the reception is hostile or friendly is an entirely contingent 
reaction to the content of that which is communicated. This distinction between the 
category of communication and its factual, historical content, which I will come back 
to later, LVSUHVXSSRVHGLQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VUDLVLQJRIWKHFRPSOH[RISUREOHPV
FRPSULVHGXQGHUWKHWHUP³WKHGLDOHFWLFRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´ 
This is not the place to go into this relation any further, since our investigation 
is not into the philosophy of language²though this would be a matter of great 
theological interest. It ought only to be remarked that proclamation constitutes a 
category of address akin to, for example, the question, the command, the request, the 
promise, and so on. It is characteristic of these forms of address that the content does 
not exist as something given independently of the corresponding category. What a 
person asks, promises, or commands is not present independently of their question, 
their promise, or their command. Attempting to abstract the content²what one 
experiences purely objectively²from the category always means a change of content. 
This difficulty does not arise with communication; it is rather characteristic of the 
category of communication that one disregards the category in order to stress 
explicitly that one comes to know something; this is what the objectivity of this 
category consists in.  
As I have already said, the content of what is proclaimed can be without 
special significance. However, normally what is proclaimed is something special that 
comes into force for the person in question, such that the proclaimed word is of higher 
significance (this proclaimed word need not have a religious content). 
{Before I proceed with my analysis of the category of proclamation, in order 
to characterize it more precisely, it might be helpful to very briefly introduce a third 
category into the investigation, namely that of the message. A message is of a very 
different character from a communication because a message is more personal. The 
person delivering a message takes the message to be of importance to the person 
receiving it, and they assume that it will have an influence on the existence 
[Tilværelse] of the recipient. In communication, however, the personal character is, so 
to speak, entirely erased in favor of the purely objective matter that the one party 
gives and the other party receives via the communication. That there have to be two 
parties for communication to take place is a precondition that is just as objective as 
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the content of the communication itself. In the message, however, the fact that there is 
one person who delivers it and one person who receives it figures in a very different 
way, because the content is not purely objective, but rather is of some personal 
importance for the recipient. There is something fateful in receiving a message. By 
contrast, whether that which is communicated has any significance or influence on the 
person receiving it is set aside; it is of no consequence for the communication. 
Both proclamation and message are therefore different from communication 
due to the presence of personal significance. But furthermore, a proclamation is 
different from a message in that what is proclaimed has significance because it comes 
into force for the recipient, whereas, by contrast, a message has significance because, 
in one way or another (whether joyfully or painfully), it is fateful for the recipient. 
It is therefore indeed no wonder that proclamation and message are given a 
religious meaning to such an extent that they are both religious terms.} 
In any case, proclamation presupposes authority; without authority, nothing 
can come into force effectively for another human being. But in order to be able to 
exercise authority, a person must be in possession of an office. The category of 
proclamation therefore cannot in any way be analyzed without the office of the 
proclamation being brought into the picture. 
The success of the proclamation, by virtue of authority, presupposes (so to 
speak) the office of the proclamation, and this is shown by the fact that, among other 
things, the proclamation always also has a public character. This is the case not only 
when the authority comes into force for all, or for a group of people who are under its 
sovereignty, but also when an authority establishes its position with respect to an 
individual²for example, when the judgment of a court is pronounced on an 
individual, in which case the proclamation has a public character in virtue of the 
authority of the office that comes with it. 
It is not always the case that the bearer of the authority presupposed by the 
proclamation does the proclaiming themselves; often what they wish to come into 
force, they permit someone else or some other people to proclaim, such that the 
authority¶V proclamation is spoken not by the authority themselves but by 
ambassadors or heralds. This is particularly true of the Christian proclamation. With 
this, we have come from the characterization of the category and of the office of 
proclamation in general to the question of the Christian proclamation in particular. 
LXWKHU¶VUHPDUNVDUHRIVSHFLDOLQWHUHVWhere because of his view of the relation 
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between the office of the proclamation and the apostolate and also because of his 
account of the relation between the office of proclamation and the office in the 
worldly government [das weltliche Regiment].3  
 
2.  
In his interpretation of the introduction to the Epistle to the Galatians, Luther claims 
(in his commentary published in 1535) that St. 3DXO¶VHPSKDVLVRQKLVRIILFHDVDQ
apostle²in the face of doubting opponents²should only servH³WRPDNHHDFKVHUYDQW
of the Word of God certain of his calling´4 And he bases this on the fact that the 
preacher does not demand authority for himself as a private person but rather on the 
grounds that God and Christ have sent him, and he serves their authority, just as, on 
earth, ambassadors serve the authority of the kings who send them [WA40.1 56; 
LW26 16]. What is characteristic here is that, for Luther, St. 3DXO¶VIRXQGDWLRQRIKLV
apostolate through a revelation of the word of God to each servant provides certainty 
UHJDUGLQJRQH¶VFDOOLQJunusquisque minister verbi Dei) [ibid.]. In short, the office of 
                                                        
3
 >%\³GDVZHOWOLFKH5HJLPHQW´/XWKHUPHDQVWRUHIHUWRKXPDQJRYHUQPHQWRUDVZH
KDYH WUDQVODWHG LW ³ZRUOGO\ JRYHUQPHQW´ ZKLFK KH FRQWUDVWV ZLWK ³GDV JHLVWOLFKH
5HJLPHQW´ZKLFKLVWKHVpiritual government or regiment. This contrast thus forms the 
FRUHRIKLV³WZRNLQJGRPV´GRFWULQHIRUDGHVFULSWLRQRIWKLVGRFWULQHVHHIRUH[DPSOH
Martin Luther, ³Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed [1523],´ 
trans. J.J. Schindel and Walther I. Brandt, in The Christian Society II, trans. Walther I. 
Brandt et al., ed. Walther I. Brandt and Helmut T. Lehmann, vol. 45 of Luther¶V:RUNV, 
trans. George V. Schick et al., ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann 
[Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1962], pp. 75±129). It is important to note that, for 
Luther, the worldly government or kingdom is not different from the spiritual 
government or kingdom in being based in secular authorities only, as God is also the 
authority behind the worldly kingdom. Rather, what makes it ³ZRUOGO\´LVWKDWLWLVD
matter of law rather than grace. It is in order to avoid this confusion that the term is 
often translated as ³UHJLPHQW´+RZHYHUWKHDVVRFLDWLRQRI³UHJLPHQW´ZLWKWKHDUP\
in English makes this confusing in other ways, so we have chosen to use ³JRYHUQPHQW´
We have flagged this here as a translation problem to keep in mind throughout the 
text.²Trans.] 
4
 0DUWLQ/XWKHU³,QHSLVWRODP63DXOLDG*DODWDV&RPPHQWDULXVH[SUDHOHFWLRQH'
0DUWLQL/XWKHULFROOHFWXV´HGU. Freitag, in pt. 1 of Galatervorlesung, 
vol. 40 of Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Karl Drescher 
(Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus, 1911), p. 56; henceforth WA 40.1, followed by page 
number; Lectures on Galatians 1535: Chapters 1±4, trans. Jaroslav Pelikan, ed. 
Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter A. Hansen, vol. 26 of  /XWKHU¶V:RUNV, trans. George V. 
Schick et al., ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia, 
1963), p. 16; trans. mod; henceforth LW26, followed by page number.  
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the apostolate is used as the basis for the usual offices that belong to the Church 
today. 
Luther distinguishes between two types of calling, an immediate calling 
[vocatio immediata] and a mediated calling [vocatio mediata]²in other words, he 
distinguishes between apostolate and the office of the proclamation in general 
[WA40.1 59; LW26 17]. The apostle is directly called through Christ, without the 
mediation of another human being: he is called to his apostleship through a revelation. 
By contrast, /XWKHUVD\VWKDW³LQRXURZQWLPH´ the bearer of the office of the 
proclamation in general is called to it by another human being [per hominem], rather 
than by Christ [ibid.]. This distinction between two types of calling follows St. Paul, 
who begins his Epistle to the Galatians by saying that KHLVQRWDQDSRVWOH³WKURXJK
PDQ´ (įȚ
ܻȞșȡȫʌȠȣ) EXW³WKURXJK-HVXV&KULVW´ (įȚޟ ߫ǿȘıȠࠎ ȋȡȚıĲȠࠎ) [Gal. 1:1]. 
This difference does not in any way mean that the immediate calling is divine 
in a way that the mediated one is not; they are both divine. The calling per hominem 
LVDOVR*RG¶VFDOOLQJWKHRWKHUPDQEHLQJRQO\WKHLQVWUXPHQWmedium) for the 
calling of God. The apostle, who is directly called by God, and the proclaimer, who is 
called by God through another human being, still stand on the same side, in 
opposition to the false teacher and the enthusiast who set themselves up as 
proclaimers by themselves [WA40.1 59; LW26 17]. The latter do not have their 
calling per hominem but ab hominibus: the calling does not have its origin in God 
mediated through another person but in a human being, namely in the individual 
themselves [ibid.]. The individual calls themselves, which means that fundamentally 
it is not a calling at all [ibid.]. This distinction is, moreover, grounded in St. 3DXO¶V
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ³WKURXJKPDQ´(įȚ
ܻȞșȡȫʌȠȣ) DQG³IURPPDQ´ ('?ʌ
'?ȞșȡȫʌȦȞ) 
[Gal. 1:1]. 
This distinction between the office of the proclamation and the apostolate 
leads Luther to his view of the relation between the office of the proclamation and the 
ZRUOGO\RIILFH7KHFDOOLQJLVWKHUHIRUHWKHGHFLVLYHWKLQJ7KH³SRZHU´>Gewalt] to 
preach and to conduct the sacrament is something that each Christian has in 
themselves. However, this power is not enough. The authorization of the performance 
of the office must come about through the community for it to be carried out 
correctly. In ³7R WKH&KULVWLDQ1RELOLW\RIWKH*HUPDQ1DWLRQ´/XWKHUIDPRXVO\VD\V
that whoever has crawled out of baptism [aus der Taufe gekrochen] may boast that he 
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has already been consecrated pastor, bishop, and pope.5 However, it is not fitting for 
everyone to exercise such an office. Because we all have the same power, such 
matters concern everyone, and no one ought to claim it for themselves without 
everyone being in agreement. The ordination of a pastor by a bishop therefore 
amounts to nothing more than the bishop choosing, in the name of the congregation, 
one person from that congregation²which consists of a multitude of people who all 
have the same ³power´²and commanding that person to use this ³power´ for the 
good of others. 
This necessity for the calling [vocatio] is due to the public character of 
proclamation. Luther also emphasizes in the Galatians commentary that the 
proclaimer has to remain within their own area of jurisdiction [see WA40.1 50±1; 
LW26 11]. To take up an initiative in public life that lies outside the jurisdiction of 
RQH¶VRIILFHLVIRU/XWKHU, an absurdity²as it also is, incidentally, for Calvin; it is, in 
truth, tantamount to the impudence of taking on responsibility for what God has 
reserved for himself. And because proclamation is an activity of public life²a 
³FRPPRQ´WKLQJDV Luther calls it in An Open Letter to the Christian Nobility ²
everything that the pastor does must fall within the domain of his office [WA6 408; 
LW44 129]. 
Luther thus operates here²both when he claims that calling is necessary for 
the office of the proclamation, and when he lays it down that the pastor should 
confine himself to his office²with a point of view that does not concern the 
proclamation and office exclusively but rather any public activity and all offices. That 
a human being ought to have a calling in order to proclaim the gospel, and that they 
ought to remain in their parish, is due not to the proclamation and its special content 
and character but rather to the fact that proclamation is a public activity. 
                                                        
5
 [Martin Luther, An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation von des christlichen 
Standes Besserung (1520), in vol. 6 of Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Anais (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1888), p. 408; henceforth 
WA6, followed by page number; ³To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation 
Concerning the Reform of the Christian State (1520),´ trans. Charles M. Jacobs and 
James Atkinson, in The Christian in Society I, ed. James Atkinson and Helmut T. 
Lehmann, vol. 44 of /XWKHU¶V:RUNV, trans. George V. Schick et al., ed. Jaroslav Pelikan 
and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 129; henceforth LW44, 
followed by page number. LXWKHU¶VRULJLQDO*HUPDQLV³DXVGHU7DXIHJHNURFNHQLVW´
which is translated by Jaroslav Pelikan in the /XWKHU¶V:RUNVHGLWLRQDV³FRPHVRXWRI
WKH ZDWHU RI EDSWLVP´ SHUKDSV EHFDXVH ³NURFKHQ´ KDV EHHQ PLVWDNHQO\ read as 
³WURFNHQ´@ 
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From a modern perspective, the following question automatically arises here: 
whether such a viewpoint, which holds for all public activity, means that the religious 
grounding has been replaced with a purely social grounding, i.e., that the requirement 
of a calling for the exercise of proclamation could be imposed simply for the sake of 
public peace and order. But this is in no way what Luther meant; he could only have 
meant this if he had had merely social reasons for requiring that an individual had a 
calling for all other public activity²that is, all worldly or civil activity. But we know 
that this is not the case. Work in the other estates [den anderen Ständen]6 is 
prescribed by God; authority in the other offices is given so that it can be exercised in 
the name of God; and, therefore, a person must have a calling for their worldly 
activity as much as for their spiritual activity. Luther can have the same view 
regarding these particular fields of the office of proclamation and worldly office 
because God has prescribed both and is active in both. A worldly office has a 
religious grounding just as much as a spiritual office does. The viewpoint of the 
calling itself, which holds for both forms of office, is religious, and it follows self-
evidently that, because it is valid for the worldly office, it is appropriate for the 
spiritual. That a calling is required for the exercise of the office of proclamation thus 
does not mean that a social interest is superior to the religious viewpoint.  
This therefore means that authority of any kind among human beings belongs 
to God: either it is entrusted to human beings by God or human beings have stolen it 
from God. This is true not only for the authority of apostles and preachers but also for 
that of princes, governing bodies, heads of household, masters, teachers, and parents. 
As such, authority sets up a difference and a dissimilarity between those who exercise 
it and those who obey it or do not obey it²a difference that cannot be conceived 
within the immanence of a doctrine of sociality. This very understanding, according 
to which there is no authority without God, equates the office of proclamation with 
that of the worldly government in a determinate and decisive relation.  
The difference between the apostolate and the office of proclamation is 
therefore not a difference in the kinds of authority. On the contrary, such authority is 
                                                        
6
 [The other estates Løgstrup is referring to here are the household and the state. For 
discussion, see our commentary also published in this issue (Christopher Bennett, Paul 
Faulkner, and Robert Stern, ³Indirect Communication, Authority, and Proclamation as 
D 1RUPDWLYH 3RZHU /¡JVWUXS¶V &ULWLTXH RI .LHUNHJDDUG´ Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal 40:1 (2019), pp. XXX)]. 
 9 
godly in the activity of an apostle as much as in the activity of any other preacher. It is 
the manner of the calling that makes the difference and whether it happens mediately 
or immediately. FurthermoreLQKLVWDONRI*RG¶V³JUHDWPHQ´>Wunderleuten], 
Luther UHFNRQVRQDFRUUHVSRQGLQJLPPHGLDWHFDOOLQJDQGDQ³H[FHSWLRQHWKLFV´
[Ausnahmeethik] also within the worldly government.7 I cannot go into this further 
here. Instead, we must be satisfied with thiVVKRUWSUHVHQWDWLRQRI/XWKHU¶V
characterization of the office of proclamation, an office that is intrinsic to the category 
of proclamation itself. 
 
3. 
To return now to the task that we set ourselves at the beginning, namely to 
characterize the difference between the category of proclamation and the category of 
communication: what is striking is that when Kierkegaard deals with similar issues, 
he deliberately chooses to use the category of communication.  
Kierkegaard proceeds from the decisive characteristic of communication, 
namely from the idea that what is communicated {in a straightforward manner} is 
something objective, known, factual.8 For him, it is therefore the case that an essential 
(thus, a decisive) truth can never be the content of a direct communication; an 
essential truth can, qua decisive truth, never be objective but must always address the 
subject and their existence. Kierkegaard adds as a further characteristic that direct 
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 >)RU/XWKHU¶VGLVFXVVLRQRI*RG¶V³JUHDWPHQ´VHH0DUWLQ/XWKHU³$XVOHJXQJGHV
101. Psalms (1534±´ HG ( 7KLele and O. Brenner, in Predigten 1545/46; 
Auslegung des 23. und 101. Psalms 1534/36; Schriften 1540/41; Sprichwörter-
Sammlung, vol. 51 of Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Karl 
Drescher (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus, 1914), pp. 207±16; [our traQV@³3VDOP´
trans. Alfred von Rohr Sauer, in Selected Psalms II, trans. Martin H. Bertram et al., ed. 
Jaroslav Pelikan, vol. 13 of /XWKHU¶V:RUNV, trans. George V. Schick et al., ed. Jaroslav 
Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1956), pp. 
143±224. In Etiske begreber og problemer /¡JVWUXS H[SODLQV WKDW WKLV ³H[FHSWLRQ
HWKLFV´ DSSOLHV ZKHQ ³D KHUR ZLWK D VSHFLDO FDOOLQJ IURP *RG DQG D VSHFLDO DELOLW\
SXQLVKHVDQXQMXVWUXOHUDQGOLEHUDWHVDSHRSOH´Etiske begreber og problemer [Aarhus: 
Klim, 2014], p. 103; [our trans.])]. 
8
 [See, for example, Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to 
Philosophical Fragments, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 12.1 
of .LHUNHJDDUG¶V :ULWLQJV, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 73±80; henceforth CUP, followed by 
page number; Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, vol. 7 of Søren Kierkegaards 
Skrifter, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et al. (Copenhagen: Gads, 2002), pp. 74±80; 
henceforth SKS7, followed by page number.] 
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communication²where what is communicated is something objective²starts with 
the fact that a human being has something to give to another and thus that direct 
communication presupposes community [see CUP 73±80; SKS7 74±80]. 
It is therefore the case that a decisive truth can never constitute the content of 
a direct communication because the only decisive thing for a human being is the 
reshaping of their existence in inwardness, which is incompatible with community. 
Ethical and religious opinion is clear that absolute passion lies beyond any mutual 
understanding:  
all understanding between individuals [Menneske] must always be in some 
third, something more abstract, which is neither of them. But in absolute 
SDVVLRQZKLFKLVVXEMHFWLYLW\¶V H[WUHPLW\DQGLQWKHLQWHQVH³KRZ´ of this 
passion, the individual is definitely [netop] most removed from this third. 
(CUP 509; SKS7 462; trans. mod.) 
In other words, the individual is faced with two options. If their life is directed 
outward, occupied with the objective and community with the other, then the world of 
objectivity and other human beings are their lords, and they relate themselves 
absolutely²immediately or in a petty bourgeois way²to all these relative things; in 
short, their own existence is a trivial matter to them. A life of obedience to a truth that 
is decisive EHFDXVHLWUHVKDSHVRQH¶VH[LVWHQFH is ruled out. But if, on the other hand, 
the truth only exists as the truth for the individual, as the truth of their own existence, 
it follows that it can also only be communicated accordingly. However, as the 
communicator can only communicate to another human being the truth as the truth of 
WKHFRPPXQLFDWRU¶VRZQH[LVWHQFHWKH\WKHUHE\PDNHWKHRWKHUGHSHQGHQWRQWKHP: 
for the recipient, the truth is not the truth of their own existence, as this exists only in 
inwardness and not in the form of community where one person is dependent on 
others. It is therefore simply the case that the direct communication of the truth 
defrauds the recipient out of the truth [CUP 75; SKS7 57]. Direct communication, if it 
concerns a decisive truth, is a contradictory undertaking.  
It is not possible here WRJRIXUWKHULQWR.LHUNHJDDUG¶VFRQFHSWRIH[LVWHQFH. 
Therefore, we must make a leap of thought and state that life in inwardness²where 
alone the decisive truth belongs, having no home in the life of outwardly directed 
immediacy and petty bourgeois existence²means, for Kierkegaard, to be in relation 
to oneself before God. To put it more clearly: where decisive truth is concerned, one 
human being has nothing to give to another; each is wholly independent of the other; 
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the decisive truth is that the human being, individual and alone, depends on God and 
that only God gives everything to a human being. Therefore, the decisive truth cannot 
be directly communicated, as that would make the recipient dependent on the 
communicator instead of on God. Or, as Johannes Climacus puts it in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, the direct communication of an essential truth, i.e., the truth 
RIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDKXPDQEHLQJEHIRUH*RGLV³DIUDXGWRZDUG*RGZKLFKSRVVLEO\
defrauds him of the worship of another person in truth), a fraud toward themselves (as 
if they had ceased to be an existing person), a fraud toward another human being 
(who possibly attains only a relative God-UHODWLRQVKLS´CUP 75; SKS7 57; trans. 
mod.).  
It might now be tempting to come to the conclusion that where it is a matter of 
an essential truth, concerning a truth of existence, communication as such is not at all 
appropriate. However, Kierkegaard does not draw this conclusion. Instead, he issues a 
demand for the ³dialectic of communication´[CUP 72; SKS7 55], which means that 
the form of the communication should express that one person has nothing to give to 
the other. The communication ought to be indirect, so that the communicator and the 
receiver are distanced from one another, and existence in inwardness²each one for 
themselves²is made possible (CUP 248±9; SKS7 224±6).  
What I indicated at the beginning is now clear, namely that the difference 
between the category and the content of communication as a form of address is a 
SUHVXSSRVLWLRQRI.LHUNHJDDUG¶VGLDOHFWLFRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ7REULHIO\UHSHDWWKH
result of the analysis of communication: according to the categorical form of 
communication itself, what is communicated is something objective, which for the 
relation between the communicator and the recipient has the significance (1) that it is 
impersonal; (2) that communication does not involve the intention to interfere with 
the existence of the recipient; and (3) that the relation between communicator and 
recipient remains unaffected by the manner of the reception. None of this need 
prevent it being the case that the factual content of what is communicated can have 
very great significance for the recipient and that therefore the danger can arise that 
they are made dependent on the communicator. Indeed, this is precisely the case when 
the content of the communication is an essential and decisive truth, since such a truth 
has the greatest possible significance for the recipient. Therefore, the task that is taken 
up by the dialectic of communication must be to avoid a relationship of dependence 
between the recipient and the communicator. 
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Such dependence can only be avoided if, despite the decisive subjective 
significance that the communication has in its content for the recipient, the category 
of communication²ZLWKLWVLPSHUVRQDORUWRXVH.LHUNHJDDUG¶VWHUPLWV³aesthetic´ 
relationship between the communicator and the recipient²is maintained. However, 
the impersonal relationship between the communicator and the recipient²in which 
they are independent of one another²now is due to the objectivity of what is 
communicated. It follows from this that the task must be to communicate a truth that 
is decisive for the recipient as if it concerned something objective. 
How can this be carried out? We can find the answer to this question if we 
recall that when the truth is something decisive it reshapes existence, whereas the 
objective as knowledge is merely the possible. The task of communicating decisive 
truth to the recipient as though it were something objective can therefore be 
completed through the dissolution of ethical reality in possibility, as happens 
precisely in what Kierkegaard calls ³LQGLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´ [CUP 248±9; SKS7 
226]. 
An example would be where the decisive truth is communicated as one of two 
contradictory possibilities, where what is emphasized to the highest possible degree is 
not only the mutual exclusiveness of these possibilities but also²and this is 
important²their equivalence, and where the communicator thus in no respect 
forestalls the choice of the recipient through their communication. In this way, the 
truth, which can only be known in the reshaping of existence, is dissolved into a 
possibility in the indirect communication, i.e., into something objective that as such 
constitutes an impersonal relation in which the communicator and the recipient are 
distanced from one another, and where the communication in its category has thus, so 
to speak, done what it can to isolate each from the other. 
The task that Kierkegaard sets himself with his demand for the dialectic of 
communication is, among other things, to prevent the recipient from becoming 
dependent on the communicator in their ethical-religious reality through admiration. 
$GPLUDWLRQLVMXVWLILDEOHLILWFRQFHUQVZKDW.LHUNHJDDUGFDOOVD³GLIIHUHQFH´²a 
talent, a characteristic, an ability, etc.²but unethical if it concerns the ethical-
religious reality of another person, for in admiration no demand is heard [CUP 27±8; 
SKS7 34]. Therefore, the ethical-religious reality of the communicator must remain 
alien to the recipient: it is simply no concern of theirs. The recipient has to do only 
with their own ethical-religious reality, and any other ethical-religious reality can only 
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concern them as a possibility for their own reality. The reality of the other must 
therefore be represented to the recipient as a mere possibility; only in this way can the 
attention of the recipient be directed away from the communicator and back on to the 
recipient themselves since the possible consists in the universal²in the ideal²that 
contains a demand. In indirect communication about a matter of decisive truth, the 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQWKXVFRPPXQLFDWHVWKHWUXWKRIWKHFRPPXQLFDWRU¶VRZQH[LVWHQFH
under the guise of an objective possibility. 
If Christianity is the truth, a new element [Moment] is added to what we have 
said so far. While each human being knows the truth by themselves, insofar as it lies 
within the sphere of the ethical and of human religiosity, nonetheless they do not 
know the Christian truth by themselves. The Christian truth must therefore be 
communicated to them, and because it has a wholly determinate content, it is an 
objective form of knowledge that can only be transmitted through direct 
communication. 
In his posthumously published work The Book on Adler, Kierkegaard goes 
more deeply into the difference between the undetermined and indefinable in 
religiosity immanent to the human sphere and the objective in Christian religiosity. 
Religious emotion is common to pious pagans, pious Jews, and to Christians; it is 
universal.9 The individual is seized by something higher, something eternal, an idea, 
which involves an inwardness within the sphere of immanence that simply rouses and 
awakens the individual to find themselves [BA 113; SKS15 268±9]. If this emotion is 
given expression in words, it does so within the sphere of pure humanity. 
Things are wholly different with a Christian emotion. Here, the individual is in 
the sphere of transcendence because what is Christian is objective and external to all 
believers; it exists even without the existence of Christians [BA 114; SKS15 269]. 
The Christian has allowed themselves to be seized by a revelation in the concrete and 
the historical; Christian belief has an historical precondition [ibid.]. In order to be able 
to give their Christian emotion expression, the individual must therefore²as 
Kierkegaard emphasizes repeatedly²be trained, indeed strenuously educated in 
                                                        
9
 [See, for example, Søren Kierkegaard, The Book on Adler, vol. 24 of .LHUNHJDDUG¶V
Writings, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), pp. 112±3; henceforth BA, followed by page number; Bogen 
om Adler, in vol. 15 of 6¡UHQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶V6NULIWHU, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et al. 
(Copenhagen: Gads, 2012), p. 268; henceforth SKS15, followed by page number.] 
 14 
specific Christian conceptual determinations [ibid.]. Correspondingly, this awakening 
must be tested and checked through this specific concept-language, to see whether it 
is really Christian and not merely universal: ³:KDWLVGHPDQGHG[Fordres] for a 
Christian awakening is on the one hand the Christian emotion and on the other the 
firmness and definiteness of conceptual language. But in our age there is a shortage of 
both´ (BA 114±5; SKS15 270; trans. mod.). 
In the outlines of a lecture series on the dialectic of communication²to be 
found in his papers from 1847²Kierkegaard therefore indicates that the difference 
between communication that is only ethical and communication that is ethical-
religious in the Christian sense is that in the latter there is a moment of knowledge 
that requires that communication be not exclusively indirect (as in the ethical case) 
but also direct, if only temporarily so.10 
However, now the following question arises: does the Christian message²
because its objectivity requires a direct form of communication²preclude that mode 
of reception that would lead to a necessary rebuilding of existence, and is it instead a 
matter of shared concern whereby the recipient comes to be dependent on the 
communicator? If the forming of a fixed concept language, in which the individual is 
to be schooled and trained, is made essential to objective Christianity, how can 
Christianity not become an objective doctrine that has nothing to do with the 
existence of the individual?  
In response to this, Kierkegaard points to the special status of what is 
objective in Christianity. The objective here is in itself a contradiction, which bears 
the features of the paradox and thus becomes an offense. Through the paradox that 
God became human, and with the offense that follows, the objective in Christianity is 
in a certain sense itself an indirect communication. 
In Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard distinguishes two forms of indirect 
communication. The first²which was dealt with by Johannes Climacus in the 
Unscientific Postscript and is more deeply explained there²is the art that consists in 
³WKHFRPPXQLFDWRU[making themselves] . . . into a nobody, purely objective, and then 
                                                        
10
 [Søren Kierkegaard, A±E, vol. 1 of 6¡UHQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶V-RXUQDOVDQG3DSHUV, trans. 
and ed. Howard V. Hong, Edna H. Hong, and Gregor Malantschuk (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1967), pp. 267±308; henceforth JP, followed by page number; 
³'HQHWKLVNHRJGHQHWKLVN-UHOLJLHXVH0HGGHOHOVHV'LDOHNWLN´LQLøse papirer, vol. 27 
of 6¡UHQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶V6NULIWHU, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et al. (Copenhagen: Gads, 
2011), pp. 387±434; henceforth SKS27, followed by page number.]  
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continually placing the qualitative opposites in a unity.´11 Anti-Climacus gives two 
H[DPSOHV³WRSODFHMHVWDQGHDUQHVWQHVVWRJHWKHULQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKHFRPSRVLWHLVD
dialectical knot²and then to be a QRERG\RQHVHOI´ DQG³WREULQJDWWDFNDQGGHIHQVH
into a unity in such a way that no one can directly say whether one is attacking or 
defending´ (PC 133; SKS12 137). It is ³communication in double reflection´: the 
communicator reflects not only on what they want to say but also on how to say it, 
since getting the form wrong can distort the content [ibid.]. It is thus characteristic of 
this form of indirect communication: (1) that qualitative opposites are put together, 
and (2) that this comes about by the communicator eliminating themselves in order to 
direct the recipient internally so that they become free [ibid.]. This is the form of 
indirect communication of the maieutic.  
In the second form of indirect communication, the communicator is not a 
nothing; on the contrary, it is precisely their existence²in which the qualitative 
opposites are combined, as in the case of the God-man²that makes communication 
indirect [PC 134; SKS12 137±8]. Christ¶V statement that he is God, which could not 
be more direct, contradicts the fact of his existence as an individual man; his own 
existence²simply through the contradiction²therefore makes his own direct 
statement into an indirect communication [ibid.]. This communication cannot be met 
with indifference, for the contradiction confronts the individual with the choice 
between faith and offense [ibid.]. Every choice provides information about what lives 
within the one who has to choose; but the thoughts of the heart reveal themselves 
most clearly when the choice is between offense and faith. This means that the 
contradiction in the objective fact that God has become human puts together infinite 
qualitative opposites, and thus the communication regarding this is indirect and the 
recipient can only meet the choice between faith and offense with their own existence 
(PC 136; SKS12 139). 
Thus, in Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard speaks not only of an indirect 
communication between human beings but also of indirect communication of God in 
                                                        
11
 [Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, vol. 20 of Kierkegaard's Writings, 
trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), p. 133; henceforth PC, followed by page number; Indøvelse i 
Christendom, in Indøvelse i Christendom, En opbyggelig Tale, To Taler ved 
Altergangen om Fredagen, vol. 12 of 6¡UHQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶V6NULIWHU, ed. Niels Jørgen 
Cappelørn et al. (Copenhagen: Gads, 2008), p 137; henceforth SKS12, followed by 
page number.] 
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the paradoxicality of revelation²though he usually only has in mind communication 
between human beings when he deals with the dialectic of communication. 
The exposition of this in Practice in Christianity raises the question of 
ZKHWKHU*RG¶VRZQLQGLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQPDNHs the dialectic of communication as 
communication between human beings superfluous. If it is the contradiction contained 
in the content itself that makes communication indirect insofar as it comes from God 
himself, can the communication of Christianity from human being to human being not 
retain the direct form, as the objective in Christianity requires? Kierkegaard answers 
in the negative [see JP 267±308; SKS27 399±406, 408±14, 430±4]. In the sketch of 
lectures on the dialectic of communication that I previously mentioned [ibid.], 
Kierkegaard emphasizes that the communication of the Christian message between 
human beings is only temporarily direct. In its essence, ethical-religious 
communication in the Christian sense is also indirect (ibid.). 
Why should this be the case? Because Christianity has become a universal 
cultural tradition, such that one is a Christian simply by living in a Christian country 
[BA 310; SKS15 125]. People have forgotten that Christianity addresses and concerns 
the individual as such, and have instead made being Christian into a matter of custom 
and tradition:  
The trouble is not that Christianity is not voiced . . . but that it is voiced in 
such a way that the majority eventually think it utterly inconsequential . . . .  
Thus the highest and holiest things make no impact whatsoever, but they are 
given sound and are listened to as something that now, God knows why, has 
become routine and habit like so much else.12  
We now turn to an opposition that we run into throughout .LHUNHJDDUG¶V
thought, namely between living as an individual or being submerged in the crowd. In 
the crowd, the human being is wholly captivated by temporal and worldly interests. 
Engaged with earthly things in all their manifoldness, in a kind of absentminded 
                                                        
12
 Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition 
for Upbuilding and Awakening, vol. 19 of .LHUNHJDDUG¶V :ULWLQJV, trans. and ed. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 
102±3; trans. mod.; henceforth SUD, followed by page number; Sygdommen til Døden, 
in Lilien paa Marken og Fuglen under Himlen, Tvende ethisk-religieuse Smaa-
$IKDQGOLQJHU 6\JGRPPHQ WLO '¡GHQ ³<SSHUVWHSU VWHQ´±³7ROGHUHQ´±
³6\QGHULQGHQ,´vol. 11 of 6¡UHQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSkrifter, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et 
al. (Copenhagen: Gads, 2006), p. 214; henceforth SKS11, followed by page number.  
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busyness, one loses oneself and begins to compare oneself with others, making 
oneself dependent on others; one goes under in the crowd. Through dependence on all 
that is earthly and manifold, the individual lets the other defraud them of themselves 
[see, for example, SUD 33±4; SKS11 150].13  
It is therefore clear that if a human being is to summon their self from life in 
the crowd, it can only be through an ethical-religious relating of oneself to the eternal; 
only thus can they snatch away their life from the temporal and the earthly that 
abandons them to the crowd. If anything, it is Christianity in particular that prevents 
the individual from being part of the crowd; the paradox confronts the individual with 
the choice between faith and offense that they can only meet alone. 
Nevertheless²despite the paradox, despite the possibility of the offense², 
one imagines oneself to be Christian precisely as a member of the crowd. The cause 
of this mistake is the inclusion of Christianity in the temporal and the worldly. 
Christianity has become so self-evident that neither paradox nor the possibility of 
offense are recognized: 
&KULVWHQGRP¶VEDVLFWURXEOHLVUHDOO\&KULVWLDQLW\WKDWWKHWHDFKLQJDERXt the 
God-Man (please note that, Christianly understood, this is safeguarded by the 
paradox and the possibility of offense) is profaned by being preached day in 
and day out, that the qualitative difference between God and man is 
pantheistically abolished (first in a highbrow way through speculation, then in 
a lowbrow way in the highways and byways). (SUD 117; SKS11 229) 
Here, we come up against the polemical situation in which Kierkegaard finds 
himself, and which makes the problem of the dialectic of communication particularly 
pressing for him²not only in regard to the communication of the ethical and ethical-
religious, of the immanent truth from human being to human being {, but also as 
regards the communication between human beings of the Christian transcendent 
truth}. Indirect communication must come on the scene. It must make present the 
paradox of objective content in Christianity. Faith and offense must be highlighted as 
                                                        
13
 [Løgstrup discusses this issue in more detail in K.E. Løgstrup, chapter title?, chap. 
1 of Kierkegaards und Heideggers Existenzanalyse und ihr Verhältnis zur 
Verkündigung (Berlin: Erich Bläschker, 1950), pp. ???; .LHUNHJDDUGDQG+HLGHJJHU¶V
Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to Proclamation, trans. Robert Stern et al. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.)] 
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equivalents so that Christianity is portrayed as a matter of the greatest difficulty and 
danger, and thus the recipient is put in the situation of having to make their decision. 
For Kierkegaard, this is the special reason why the historical situation points 
to the necessity of indirect communication. Moreover, the truth of Christianity still 
applies to the existence of the individual, even though it has an objective content. It is 
the same with Christian truth as with immanent ethical-religious truth: it becomes 
known and communicated only in the reshaping of existence. Kierkegaard expresses 
this in The Concept of Anxiety thus: ³Preaching means really conversing with one 
another; that is the art of preaching. But appropriation is the secret of this form of 
conversation.´14 But then the truth of Christianity must also be communicated 
indirectly so that the recipient does not thereby defraud God and themselves out of the 
DSSURSULDWLRQE\EHLQJGHSHQGHQWRQWKHFRPPXQLFDWRU¶VDSSURSULDWLRQ.  
But this demand for indirect communication does not apply to the apostle [see 
CUP 243; SKS7 221]. By contrast their communication is direct, even though it 
concerns the decisive and essential truth [ibid.]. The direct communication of the 
apostle does not make the recipient dependent on the apostle rather than on God. Of 
course, the apostle communicates the essential and decisive truth, but not as the truth 
of their own existence. This is not to say that the truth is not of their own existence 
but merely that such truth is not the basis of their communication. The basis for their 
communication is not the transformation of their own existence through this truth but 
rather that through a revelation they are called to proclaim the truth. So, no one to 
whom the apostle directly communicates the truth becomes dependent on them; the 
                                                        
14
 Here, Løgstrup is paraphrasing, though misquoting, Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept 
of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of 
Hereditary Sin, trans. and ed. Reidar Thomte and Albert B. Anderson, vol. 8 of 
KierkegaarG¶V:ULWLQJV, ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), p. 16; trans. mod.; Begrebet Angest, in Gjentagelsen, Frygt og 
Bæven, Philosophiske Smuler, Begrebet Angest, Forord, vol. 4 of 6¡UHQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶V
Skrifter, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et al. (Copenhagen: Gads, 1998), p. 323. [We have 
translated the quote as he wrote it, but here is the full quote given in the above-cited 
WUDQVODWLRQ³%XWWRSUHDFKLVUHDOO\WKHPRVWGLIILFXOWRIDOODUWVDQGLVHVVHQWLDOO\WKe 
art that Socrates praised, the art of being able to converse. It goes without saying that 
the need is not for someone in the congregation to provide an answer, or that it would 
be of help continually to introduce a respondent. What Socrates criticized in the 
Sophists, when he made the distinction that they indeed knew how to make speeches 
but not how to converse, was that they could talk at length about every subject but 
lacked the element of appropriation. Appropriation is precisely the secret of 
conversDWLRQ´ibid.).] 
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apostle has, as it were, no individual existence to which anyone can be bound; their 
existence is all taken up with their task. So, what they have to give is what God²who 
assigned them the task²has to give; their communication can thus be direct without it 
leading to the deception that would be the meaning of direct communication by any 
other Christian. In short, the apostle has no individual existence of their own from 
which the other must be liberated through indirect communication; their own 
existence is completely transfigured [aufgehoben] by the task they have received 
through revelation {²the task to deliver the truth}. 
Kierkegaard gives a further reason for why the communication of the apostle 
is direct, namely that the content of Christianity was unknown for their audience. In 
the Postscript, he puts it DVIROORZV³The position of an apostle is something else, 
because he must proclaim an unknown truth, and therefore direct communication can 
always have its validity temporarily´ (CUP 243; SKS7 221). But the moment of 
knowledge is not the decisive reason why the communication of the apostle is direct, 
as it can only justify this directness temporarily. We can thus dispense with it here. 
The crucial reason why the communication of the apostle is direct is, to put it 
briefly, the task. The apostle²simply through this task²is outside the 
aforementioned alternative that otherwise faces each Christian: that being-before-God 
is only possible in inwardness and not in the being-outwardly-directed that is a life in 
immediacy and petty bourgeois existence, where one lets oneself be determined by 
the world and other human beings. 
Of course, the life of the apostle, like life in inwardness, consists in being-
before-God; for if there is any existence that has been reshaped in relationship with 
God, it is the existence of the apostle. Nevertheless, the life of the apostle is oriented 
to the outside. The reason the DSRVWOH¶Vbeing-outwardly-directed does not exclude the 
relation to God is that they are called to this life through the paradoxical fact of a 
revelation. By virtue of this calling through a revelation, the reshaping of their 
existence consists in their being completely taken up by the task. In ³7he Difference 
between a Genius and an Apostle,´ Kierkegaard puts it like this:  
So an apostle primarily has only to be faithful in his duty, which is to carry out 
his mission. Even if an apostle is never persecuted, his sacrificial life consists 
HVVHQWLDOO\LQWKLVµWKDWKHKimself SRRURQO\PDNHVRWKHUVULFK¶WKDWKH
never dares to take the time or the quiet or the freedom from care in pleasant 
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days. . . . Spiritually understood, he is like the busy housewife who herself, in 
order to prepare food for the many mouths, scarcely has time to eat.15  
The apostle is FDOOHG³WRJRRXWLQWRWKHZRUOGWRSURFODLPWKHWord, to act and to 
suffer . . . [is called] to the unceasingly active life DVWKH/RUG¶VPHVVHnger´ (DGA 
106; SKS11 109±10). 
The life of the apostle is thus directed externally just as much as the life in 
immediacy and in petty bourgeois existence. The being-outwardly-directed, however, 
does not involve the world and other people being the lords of their life but is rather a 
life for the other, which is ruled by God²the being-outwardly-directed is grounded in 
their life as one single task, to which they are called through a revelation. 
The difference between the apostle and every other Christian can be further 
determined in a way that is closely connected to the difference between direct and 
indirect communication. If, for every other Christian except the apostle, the truth only 
exists as the truth of their own existence, and as such can only be communicated in a 
way that takes account of the demand of the dialectic of communication, it is clear 
that such a communication is without authority. By contrast the apostle²whose 
existence does not draw attention to itself, and whose communication can be direct, 
because their existence is wholly taken up with their task²speaks in the name of God 
and with godly authority. For this reason, and with regard to the question of authority, 
Kierkegaard characterizes direct communication in the mouth of the apostle as 
proclamation [see DGA 106; SKS11 109]. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard has no sense for 
what is peculiar in the category of proclamation²characterized by authority²namely 
that what is proclaimed comes into force; he therefore continues to use the category of 
communication also for the case of the apostle. 
 
4. 
We now come to an especially distinctive and, I would like to say, far reaching 
difference between Luther and Kierkegaard. As we saw, for Luther, the difference 
between the apostles and every other Christian does not consist in a difference in the 
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 >6¡UHQ.LHUNHJDDUG³7KH'LIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQD*HQLXVDQGDQ$SRVWOH´ in Without 
Authority, vol. 18 of .LHUNHJDDUG¶V:ULWLQJV, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna 
H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 106; trans. mod.; henceforth 
DGA, followed by page number; ³Om Forskjellen mellem et Genie og en Apostel´LQ
SKS11 109.] 
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authority with which they speak, as this is equally godly in both cases. This is why the 
office of the apostle can also be used to give each servant of God the certainty of their 
calling. The difference lies only in the type of calling, whether it is immediate or 
mediate. By contrast, for Kierkegaard, the difference lies in authority; there is 
authority only in the case of an immediate calling [vocatio immediata]²or, as 
Kierkegaard puts it, in the paradoxical fact of the calling through a revelation. But it 
follows from this that, since the office of proclamation in general stands or falls with 
authority, he has no place for such an office of proclamation; beside the authorized 
speech of the apostle, there is only the indirect communication of the Christian. Thus, 
the Book On Adler tells us that he who is called by God in a special sense, that is to 
say through a revelation, ³can be known straightaway by the fact that they invoke his 
DXWKRULW\´ (BA 25; SKS15 110; trans. mod.). This difference between Luther and 
Kierkegaard is essential insofar as it connects precisely with their widely varying 
views on life within the worldly government. /XWKHU¶VGLVFXVVLRQFRQFHUQLQJ an 
office of proclamation in general, where the pastor speaks with authority without 
being an apostle, presupposes, as we saw, that in respect of divinity there is no 
difference between the authority of the proclamation and the authority of any office of 
worldly government. By contrast, if Kierkegaard does not recognize any office of 
proclamation other than the apostolate, it is, among other things, because he denies 
that the authority exercised in any worldly office is in any way divine. 
It ought to be conceded that Kierkegaard makes comments on proclamation 
and its authority throughout his work. For example, he writes the following in a 
footnote to ³2QWKH'LIIHUHQFH between D*HQLXVDQGDQ$SRVWOH´³Authority is a 
specific quality either of an Apostolic calling or of ordination. To preach is precisely 
to use authority, and that this is what it is to preach has simply been altogether 
forgotten in our day´ (DGA 99n.52; SKS11 103n.). The parallel between a calling 
through revelation for the apostle, and ordination for the pastor is implied in a remark 
in the Postscript³A pastor is essentially what he is by ordination, and ordination is a 
WHDFKHU¶VSDUDGR[LFDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQWLPH´CUP 273; SKS7 248). However, these 
and similar remarks²in particular, the reference to ordination²are neither justified 
nor further investigated; they are just bare assertions. The decisive presupposition of 
the authority of the apostles²that their existence is taken up by the task²is precisely 
not available to the pastor; ordination does not bring this about. But then what is the 
basis of the parallel between calling through revelation (which provides for the 
 22 
authority of the apostle) and through ordination (which secures the authority of the 
pastor)? We are not told. And indeed Kierkegaard cannot tell us, for the idea of an 
office of proclamation lies beyond the horizon of his categories. That there is a 
connection between this and .LHUNHJDDUG¶V{secularized} conception of the life of 
worldly government can now finally be shown. 
To illustrate the fact that authority is the decisive qualitative feature in the case 
of the apostle, Kierkegaard first of all uses worldly authority. In neither case does a 
SHUVRQ¶VZRUG possess authority because of thDWSHUVRQ¶V aesthetic, philosophical or 
moral qualifications:  
To ask if a king is a genius, and in that case to be willing to obey him, is 
basically high treason, because the question contains a doubt about submission 
to authority. To be willing to obey a government department if it can come out 
with witticisms LVEDVLFDOO\PDNLQJDIRRORIWKHGHSDUWPHQW7RKRQRURQH¶V
father because he is exceptionally intelligent is impiety. (DGA 101; SKS11 
105) 
A person¶V qualifications may make their words stand out aesthetically, 
philosophically, or morally, but such qualifications never confer authority on them²
just as little as a fault in their personal qualifications might rob them of authority: ³On 
the other hand, whether a police officer, for example, is a scoundrel or an upright 
man, as soon as hHLVRQGXW\KHKDVDXWKRULW\´ (DGA 99; SKS11 103). If this were 
not the case, then authority would only replicate profundity, brilliance, or morality, 
and it would not have its own distinctive character. But authority is something 
distinctive, and its distinctive character lies in the fact that a human being always 
derives their authority from somewhere else. An apostle has authority because they 
derive it from another place²from God. An envoy has authority because they derive 
it from another place²from the king. A police officer has authority because they 
derive it from another place²from the government. In short, in relation to all the 
individual¶VRZQ qualifications, authority is something completely different [Ĳ'ü 
'GĲİȡȠȞ], whether it concerns an apostle or a human being who has authority conferred 
on them through a worldly office. Up until this point there is complete agreement 
EHWZHHQ/XWKHUDQG.LHUNHJDDUG.LHUNHJDDUG¶VREVHUYDWLRQVRQWKLVFRUUHVSRQG
completely to those of Luther in the FRPPHQWDU\RQ6W3DXO¶V(SLVWOHWRWKH
Galatians. Indeed, Kierkegaard even writes that³In the sphere of immanence, 
authority is utterly unthinkable´ (DGA 99; SKS11 103). 
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But this is as far as their agreement goes. That is, Kierkegaard does not draw 
/XWKHU¶Vconclusion that any authority among human beings, including the authority 
of the worldly government, belongs to God, whether this has been entrusted to human 
beings by God or stolen by human beings from God. On the contrary, Kierkegaard 
maintains that among human beings only the apostles are under godly authority. What 
is the situation, then, with the authority of the worldly government, or as Kierkegaard 
puts it, ³in the political, civic, social, domestic, and disciplinary realms´>LELG@? 
Kierkegaard does not express himself clearly on this point. The citation given just 
above²³In the sphere of immanence, authority is utterly unthinkable´²which 
doubtless means that there is no authority that is not bestowed by God²is followed 
immediately by DFRQWUDGLFWRU\FODLP³or it can be thought only as transitory´ (ibid.). 
Two points show the nature of the unclarity that causes such a contradiction. 
The first point is that the difference between the godly authority of the 
apostles and worldly authority can only be determined metaphysically. The difference 
is that human authority is said to be VRPHWKLQJ³vanishing´²either already in 
temporality or at least along with temporality², while divine authority stands in 
eternity. The difference between authorities and subjects, between parents and 
children, disappears in eternity, but the difference between the apostle and other 
human beings remains for eternity. Kierkegaard puts it like this: ³By this paradoxical 
fact the apostle is for all eternity made paradoxically different from all other human 
beings´ (DGA 95; SKS11 99).  
This must be metaphysics! Why does the authority of the apostle not disappear 
in eternity, as does the authority of public authorities and of parents? The answer is: 
because the authority of the apostles is godly. But then must it not disappear precisely 
because it is godly²i.e., in eternity, where God himself gives everything to human 
beings? :HFDQH[SODLQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶V metaphysics by reference to his {secularized} 
views on life in vocation and estate; he disqualifies life in the worldly ordinances 
[Lebens in den weltlichen Ordnungen] as nothing but immanence and relativity. For if 
Kierkegaard gave up his²metaphysical²view that the apostle in all eternity is 
different from all other human beings, and if he were instead to advocate that in the 
eternal where God himself gives everything to human beings the authority of the 
apostle also disappears, then the office of the apostle and its authority would become 
like any other; and then its office and its authority in worldly life would be godly, the 
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³VSKHUHRILPPDQHQFH´would not simply be ³LPPDQHQFH,´DQGWKH³UHODWLYLW\RI
KXPDQOLIH´would not simply be ³UHODWLYLW\.´ 
The second SRLQWRIXQFODULW\LQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDUJXPHQW is that his positive 
characterization of authority, namely that human beings derive it from elsewhere, 
does not hold, according to Kierkegaard¶V own definition of genuine authority in the 
worldly government. 
We were told that as the apostle has authority from God, the envoy has 
authority from the king, and the police officer has authority from the government. But 
from where does the king, the government, or²we might add²the parents, get their 
authority? About this we are told nothing. Thus, for those who, in worldly life, have 
their own authority, only the negative characteristic holds²that they do not have it by 
way of their personal qualifications: the king does not have authority because he is a 
genius; the government does not have authority because it makes wise decrees; the 
father does not have authority because he is clever. The positive characteristic, 
according to which human beings acquire authority from elsewhere, is, on the 
contrary, only valid for secondary authorities whose authority is derivative²for 
example, that of the envoy or the police officer²but it is not valid of those who have 
real authority, such as governing bodies or parents. Regarding these latter we are left 
wholly in the dark. 
The reason for this is that Kierkegaard does not recognize and will not draw 
/XWKHU¶VFRQFOXVLRQ: that governing bodies and parents also have authority in the one 
way through which a human being can have it, namely by it being conferred on them 
by God. With his determination of authority as completely different [Ĳ'ü 'GĲİȡȠȞ] in 
relation to all personal qualities, Kierkegaard has in reality determined it as that which 
a human being has by virtue of their office. The concept of an office, however, lies 
beyond his horizon, and he cannot take this last step. And this cannot but lead to 
unclarity. 
Thus, because Kierkegaard denies a godly character to authority in the worldly 
government²on the basis that only the apostle stands in godly authority through 
immediate calling [vocatio immediata], which no one else has²the office of 
proclamation, as already mentioned, lies beyond the Kierkegaardian categories. 
However, we must observe that although the content, the message, and the 
Word to be proclaimed are the same in the proclamation of the apostles as in that of 
any other Christian, the authority and office of proclamation in general does not 
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behave like that of the apostle but rather like authority and office in the worldly 
government. That is to say, the call to the office of proclamation does not come about, 
as in the case of the apostle, through an immediate calling, but rather through man 
[per hominem], as in the call to an office of the worldly government. 
AIWHUWKLVFRQIURQWDWLRQEHWZHHQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDQG/XWKHU¶VYLHZVRQWKH
relation between the apostolate, the office of proclamation, and the office of worldly 
government, we can now return to the reason for making this comparison: the 
problem of the dialectic of communication. Here the crucial thing in the apostolate in 
and for itself was not the immediate calling but its consequence: that the task 
transfigures the existence of the apostle. The position of an apostle, as Kierkegaard 
writes in the Postscript, is ³TXDOLWDWLYHO\GLIIHUHQWIURPWKDWRIRWKHUVDQGhis 
H[LVWHQFHMXVWLILHGZKHQLWLVDVQRRQHHOVH¶VFDQpossibly be´CUP 453; SKS7 412). 
Therefore, the existence of the apostle does not present the danger of binding the 
recipient authoritatively or through admiration; it does not stand in the way of the 
relation of the recipient to God himself, which is also why the apostle does not need 
to make use of the dialectic of communication but can employ direct speech with 
divine authority. 
Correspondingly, for any other Christian, it is not crucial that they do not have 
an immediate calling. Rather, what matters is what follows from this: namely that 
their existence is thus not transfigured in their task; their existence is like the 
existence of other human beings, which is why the Christian²without any godly 
authority²can only communicate the truth as a truth concerning their own existence 
using the dialectic of communication. 
On this point, it must be said that what the task does to the existence of the 
apostle²namely that it transfigures it and liberates the apostle from the dialectic of 
communication²is carried out in the existence of the proclaimer by the office. This, 
however, lies beyond .LHUNHJDDUG¶VKRUL]RQ 
Kierkegaard does not pose the question whether, among all the address- and 
speech-categories that are available to us and that are not used for the transmission of 
knowledge, there are any that are appropriate for Christian truth. To such a question 
the answer must be: the category of proclamation is appropriate for Christian truth. 
The content of proclamation LV*RG¶VIRUJLYHQHVVDQG judgment²not knowledge, but 
something that comes into force for those who hear the Word spoken to them. That 
the category of proclamation presupposes an authority that brings into force what is 
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proclaimed ultimately means that God is the source of all authority, such that here the 
sole bearer of authority, by performing what is proclaimed, brings it into force for 
those to whom it is proclaimed. 
Kierkegaard also does not pose the question of whether Christian truth may 
require one of the address- or speech-categories that do not impart knowledge, and 
that therefore do not make the hearer dependent on the speaker. It must be answered 
that proclamation, by virtue of the office that it presupposes, corresponds to Christian 
truth. That is to say, the office prevents the proclaimer imagining that they 
themselves, as a private person, have something to give the other, as is also the case 
for the hearer; the office renders the private relation of the proclaimer to the content 
of the proclamation null and void. 
If one wanted to put the divergence between Luther and Kierkegaard into a 
neutral formula, one could say that for each proclaimer, except the apostle, two 
opposed demands are valid: a demand that proceeds from the office, which requires 
direct communication, and a demand that proceeds from the existence-form of the 
proclaimer, which requires the opposite, namely indirect communication. For Luther, 
the demand proceeds from the office; for Kierkegaard, by contrast, it proceeds from 
the existence-form. 
Of course, this connects with the different polemical situations in which 
Luther and Kierkegaard fouQGWKHPVHOYHV/XWKHU¶VHPSKDVLVRQWKHRIILFHRFFXUVLQD
battle against the self-chosen and self-fabricated action of justification by works, 
which makes the life of occupation and status despicable.LHUNHJDDUG¶VGHPDQGIRU
the dialectic of communication for the sake of the recipient and the communicator 
arises in a battle against speculation (which makes Christianity into a doctrine and a 
form of knowledge) and against petty bourgeois life (which takes being Christian to 
be a matter of course and to be nothing disturbing).  
We cannot conclude our investigation without addressing another question 
that emerges here²though it leads beyond the subject and so can only be treated 
briefly.  
For Kierkegaard, there is nothing in finitude that pulls a human being up short; 
there is nothing that creates an ethically-religiously relevant situation in which the 
human being is called to a decision. Rather, finitude is levelled out to nothing but 
relative ends and nothing but immanence. 
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By contrast, for Luther, finitude itself gives occasion for a human being to be 
brought up short; the ethical situation and its decision comes with finitude²as a 
finitude ordered into offices. Life in finitude exists for him as a life in offices²as 
child, as father or mother, as spouse, as master or servant, as public authority or 
subject, and so on. For Luther, finitude is in no way mere immanence. In finitude, 
God places his demand on the individual, God contradicts the egoism of the 
individual through the neighbor that he forces on the individual by ordering life in 
finitude into a life in offices. According to Luther, the Christian should not trouble 
themselves with how the ethical situation with its demand and decision comes into 
being.  
By contrast, Kierkegaard has nothing to expect from a finitude leveled down 
into relativity and immanence. It gives him no answer to the question as to when and 
where the ethical situation and its demand comes in; the Christian must create this 
moment for themselves, making their life stressed and troubled. The life of the 
Christian consists in the concern to create the ethical-religious situation by oneself at 
every moment through extreme effort. As Johannes Climacus says: ³A singer cannot 
incessantly sing vibrato; once in a while a note is tremolo. But the religious person 
whose religiousness is hidden inwardness strikes the vibrato, if I may so speak, of the 
relationship with God in everything´ (CUP 475; SKS7 431). He continues, ³The 
absolute conception of God consumes him like the fire of the summer sun when it 
refuses to set, like the fire of the summer sun when it refuses to cease´(CUP 485; 
SKS7 439). 
It is indeed correct that the individual levels down finitude in immediacy and 
in finite ways of thinking, and in selfishness makes everything into their own²
relative²goals, to which they relate themselves absolutely. But that does not mean 
that finitude as such²that is, in its ordering through God²is only of relative value. It 
is only of relative value in the leveling of immediacy and of finite ways of thinking in 
selfishness. 
Christianity cannot amount to an endorsement of this leveling. But LVQ¶WWKDW 
what Kierkegaard does? Is this not precisely the difference between Luther and 
Kierkegaard? If, for Kierkegaard, Christianity amounts to the Christian creating the 
ethical-religious situation, at each moment, for themselves, in their own internality, 
must the precondition for this not be the levelling of the finite? By contrast, /XWKHU¶V
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ethics of calling is based on an understanding of the levelling as a destruction of the 
divine ordering of finitude. 
 
* * * 
 
It is naturally a risky undertaking²critically²to contrast the thought of two men as 
far apart in time and place as Luther and Kierkegaard. The polemical situation in 
which they spoke, the thought and world that they attacked, are very different from 
one another. Playing the one off against the other can easily lead to an ignoring of the 
polemical situation of the person whom one criticizes. And certainly, many 
theologians would believe that such a critical confrontation is a bad thing. From the 
standpoint of rational inquiry, they will say, the surest thing is to stick to an account 
dominated by historical perspective; only in this way can proper consideration be 
taken of the historical and polemical situation. 
But however crucial it might be to recognize that the opinions of any thinker 
are historically and polemically determined, it is equally important that the truly 
engaging questions and problems remain the same. It is simply one of the 
preconditions of systematic theology that, if we only dive deep enough into the 
thought-world of an epoch, a school, or a theologian, we come up against a series of 
questions that are always the same. 
It will therefore not do, out of a pure will to understand earlier thinkers 
objectively in their different polemical context and historical situation, to close our 
eyes to the fact that the answers they give to the same questions are incompatible and 
that their theological positions are not only different but contradict one another. It is, 
for example, not enough to show, DV,LQWLPDWHGDERYHKRZ/XWKHU¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of the category and the office of proclamation is determined by his argument with the 
Catholic Church, or KRZ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VWKRXJKWRQWKHGLDOHFWLFRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQLV
occasioned by his argument with the philosophy of Hegel, and then to state that each 
has something especially decisive to say in these arguments. From the pure will to 
understand and appreciate each contribution in its own right and develop their ideas 
against the background of their situation, we should not make it seem as though what 
they said was otherwise the same, or as if the difference was only to be explained 
historically. If their answers to certain fundamental questions are not only different 
but incompatible, it is the task of systematic theology to account for these differences. 
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